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Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators  
for Debt Crises in Europe 
Abstract  
European authorities and scholars published proposals on which indicators of macro-
economic imbalances might be used to uncover risks for the sustainability of public debt 
in the European Union. We test the ability of four proposed sets of indicators to send 
early-warnings of debt crises using a signals approach for the study of indicators and the 
construction of composite indicators. We find that a broad composite indicator has the 
highest predictive power. This fact still holds true if equal weights are used for the con-
struction of the composite indicator in order to reflect the uncertainty about the origin of 
future crises. 
Keywords: macroeconomic surveillance, macroeconomic imbalances, economic gover-
nance, signals approach, European Union (EU), European Monetary Union (EMU)  
JEL Classification: C14, E61, E62, F40  
IWH   __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH Discussion Paper 12/2011 
4
 Makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte als Indikatoren 
für Staatsschuldkrisen in Europa 
Zusammenfassung  
Europäische Institutionen und Wissenschaftler haben Vorschläge für die Verwendung 
bestimmter Indikatoren makroökonomischer Ungleichgewichte zur Aufdeckung von Ri-
siken für die Tragbarkeit der Staatsverschuldung in der Europäischen Union unterbreitet. 
Wir testen, ob die vier vorgeschlagenen Indikatoren-Sets in der Lage sind, Frühwarn-
signale für Schuldenkrisen zu senden. Wir verwenden einen Signalansatz zur Analyse 
der einzelnen Indikatoren und zur Konstruktion von Verbundindikatoren. Es zeigt sich, 
dass  ein  breiter  Verbundindikator  die  höchste  Vorhersagekraft  hat.  Dieses  Ergebnis 
wird auch bestätigt, wenn die Indikatoren gleichgewichtet verwendet werden, um die Un-
sicherheit bezüglich künftiger Krisenursachen abzubilden. 
 
Schlagwörter: makroökonomische Überwachung, makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte, 
wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung, Europäische Union (EU), Europäische Währungs-
union 
JEL-Klassifikation: C14, E61, E62, F40  
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Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators for Debt 
Crises in Europe 
1  Introduction 
The debt crises in some countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) following 
the recent global financial crisis made the failure of existing political instruments for the 
prevention of excessive public debts evident. In particular the focus on the ratio of pub-
lic deficits to GDP in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was insufficient for the anal-
ysis of debt sustainability. For example, the burst of a real estate bubble and accompa-
nying decline of real economic activity in Spain led to a slump of public income that 
could not be compensated by cuts in public expenditure on such a short notice. In Irel-
and, the drawing of public guarantees by faltering banks put high pressure on public 
finances. As in Spain, also in Ireland neither the level of existing public debt nor newly 
accruing deficits could warn of the massive risks for public solvency. 
Because of these insufficiencies, political and economic institutions on national and Eu-
ropean levels discuss longer-term fundamental developments and risks underlying the 
sustainability of public  debt under the keywords “Macroeconomic surveillance” and 
“Economic  Governance”.  Proposals  for  institutional  reforms  were  for  example  pub-
lished by the German Federal Ministry for Economy and Technology (BMWi) (2010), 
by the European Commission (EC) (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), by the European Central 
Bank (2010), and by a taskforce of the European Council (2010). In these documents an 
evaluation of macroeconomic imbalances using an indicator approach is proposed. The 
surveillance of a set of indicators will allow the evaluation of the macroeconomic situa-
tions in countries belonging to the EMU. A debate, founded on these proposals, evolved 
on the question, which indicators of macroeconomic imbalances are capable to send ear-
ly and reliable warning signals. 
In this paper we analyze for the first time whether the proposed indicators are able to 
signal risks for excessive public debt in the corresponding countries of the EMU. The 
question is answered using the early-warning capability of the proposed indicators in the 
framework of a signals approach. This approach was presented first in Kaminsky, Li-
zondo and Reinhart (1998) for currency crises and in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
and Kaminsky (1999) for twin-crises (joint occurrence of banking and currency crises). 
Reinhart (2002) uses the signals approach to link currency crises to sovereign debt cris-
es in emerging markets. Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets have been the focus 
of many studies, as for example Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003), Ma-
nasse and Roubini (2009), Pescatori and Sy (2004). However, to our knowledge the sig-
nals approach is applied for the first time to signal debt crises in developed markets in  
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this paper. Another novelty of this paper is that, for the first time, we apply this debt cri-
sis forecasting technique to a case of a currency union, where only four out of eleven 
analyzed countries experienced a crisis. We find that a combination of all proposed in-
dicators could have sent strong signals of upcoming public debt crises. Particularly ap-
pealing in our results is the stability of the high predictive power to several modifica-
tions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the following section we discuss the 
term “macroeconomic imbalances” and how the existence of these imbalances might 
lead to public debt crises. In the third section we present indicators for an early-warning 
system out of four different proposals. The method of the signals approach, especially 
the condensation of different indicators to a composite indicator, is given in section 
four. In section five, we present and discuss the obtained results, followed by a proposal 
for a new composite indicator in section 6. The two final sections then contain robust-
ness analyses and the conclusions. 
2  Public Debt Crises and Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Before the introduction of the Euro as the common currency for the European Monetary 
Union it had been argued by some scholars that a monetary union should ideally be ac-
companied by some form of fiscal policy coordination (e.g. von Hagen and Hammond, 
1998). In the absence of such a coordination, excessive debt in some countries of the 
monetary union might cause costs for other members via increased interest rates or 
might even lead to higher inflation and risks for the external stability of the common 
currency if the central bank is not willing or able to counteract the expansionary fiscal 
policies (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). Thus, the minimum form of coordination should be 
limits to public debt and deficits in the EMU. Accordingly, member states agreed on 
what is called the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It lined out that public debt should 
not exceed a sustainable level (60 percent of GDP) and, therefore, public spending and 
public revenues should be balanced, allowing for deficits of up to 3 percent of GDP. For 
countries  not  fulfilling  the  requirements,  measures  of  punishment  have  been  imple-
mented.  
Whilst the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has already been weakened by avoiding the 
punishment of Germany and France, who failed to stick to the rules in 2003, it has prov-
en to fail to cope with the sudden changes in the financial sector, its real economy ef-
fects, and its fiscal effects in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Countries that 
had been able to fulfill all the criteria of the SGP were not safe from facing turbulent 
and unsustainable public finances. It became evident that reacting to present fiscal defi-
cits that exceeded the limits of the SGP might be too late to avoid excessive debt, refi-
nancing difficulties, and default pressures.  
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Regarding fiscal policy coordination, two proposals have been suggested by European 
institutions to address the shortcomings of the current institutions (Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2011). The first proposal is to tighten the SGP, including further sanctions 
and the involvement of European institutions in the budget planning process (the Euro-
pean Semester). The second proposal is to discuss potential risks for the sustainability of 
public debt. If the sudden emergence of large public deficits is not seen as an early indi-
cator for fiscal distress that might cause sovereign default, but already as an expression 
of unsustainable public debt, it is important to focus on potential determinants of the 
sudden changes in public finances. Stylized facts about the countries with refinancing 
difficulties and the ones without, lead to the hypothesis that evolving imbalances in ma-
croeconomic and financial parameters, e.g. property price bubbles and foreign trade def-
icits, are at the root of sudden changes in public finances. The proposal of monitoring, 
discussion, and regulation of these imbalances is currently debated under the term of 
macroeconomic surveillance.  
Public institutions and scholars proposed sets of indicators to be observed to detect im-
balances that might result in fiscal stress. Accordingly, if imbalances emerge, European 
institutions might request deeper analysis of the potential vulnerabilities of economies 
and – if countries fail to react – to impose punishment on the countries. So far, the lite-
rature does not provide an analysis of which indicators are useful early indicators for 
unsustainable public debt and eventually public debt crisis. This paper provides an anal-
ysis of the ability of different proposed indicators and sets of indicators to forecast pub-
lic debt crises.  
To analyze the explanatory power of potential determinants of changes in the sustaina-
bility of public debt it is necessary to define a dependent variable, i.e. what is meant by 
unsustainable public debt, fiscal stress, or public debt crises. From the above elabora-
tions it is straight forward that a sovereign default is a too narrow definition, because 
even before a default, excessive debt might cause risks for the success of the common 
monetary policy. The same argument holds true for crises definitions relying on debt re-
structurings, IMF loans or large arrears (as, for example, in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
or Manasse and Roubini (2009)). It is also evident, that the variable of fiscal deficits or 
debts in percent of GDP is too imprecise, because different countries might be able to 
cope with different levels of debt and different deficits. Pressure on the monetary union 
is caused by the potential inability of a member country to serve its debt, which would 
lead to bail outs or (partial) default. In line with the literature on sovereign debt crisis 
we  choose  the  criterion  of  extraordinary  high  default  risk  premiums,  which  can  be 
measured by the difference between the yield of a country’s bond and a proxy for a safe 
investment. For example Pescatori and Sy (2004) in their analysis of debt crises in de-
veloping countries use the spreads of government bond yields against the yields of U.S. 
treasury bonds. A high spread of government bond yields is interpreted as a serious  
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doubt in the governments’ capacity to service its debt in the future.1 We refer to ex-
traordinary high bond spreads as public debt crises in the rest of the paper. 
Most of the European debt is denoted in Euro. Because we want to exclude exchange 
rate risks in our analysis, we do not choose the yields of U.S. treasury bonds as the ref-
erence in the spreads, but the average of the yields of AAA-rated countries of the EMU. 
Our crisis variable is thus 
  
  =   
  −   
   , 
the yield   of a government bond of country   at time   with a maturity of ten years mi-
nus the average yield of government bonds of EMU-countries with AAA-rating with 
maturity of ten years at time  .2 In this paper, we use monthly data on the yields of gov-
ernment bonds for all Euro-12 countries except Luxembourg (i.e.: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) since the introduction 
of the Euro (01.01.1999 or 01.01.2001 for Greece, respectively) until 01.04.2011. We 
calculate  the  mean      and  standard  deviation      of  all  spreads.  As  in  Knedlik  and 
Scheufele (2008), a crisis occurs in a country, when   
  ≥    + 1.65    ≅ 166.4  .3 
Using tis definition we find four countries with debt crises in our sample: Greece, start-
ing in January 2010, Ireland and Spain starting in June 2010, and Portugal starting in Ju-
ly 2010. Since both, countries and first manifestations of debt servicing difficulties are 
in line with common sense on crisis countries in the euro area, we use these crisis dates 
for testing the goodness of indicator sets to signal debt crises in the euro area.4 
3  Proposed Indicators 
We  discuss  four  different  sets  of  macroeconomic  imbalances  indicators  that  should 
warn against possible debt crises in a country up to 24 months in advance. The different 
sets were proposed by BMWi (2010), European Commission (EC, 2010b), European 
Central Bank (ECB, 2010) and Heise (2011).5 While the indicators in Heise (2011) are 
                                                 
1   One could argue that due to imperfect and irrational capital markets, difficulties of debt service are 
not fully reflected in government yields. For example, yields of European government bonds con-
verged during the first years after the introduction of the Euro. A discrimination of the different 
countries of the EMU was only triggered by the advent of the financial crisis in 2007. On the other 
hand, the yields of government bonds might rise during speculative attacks. However, it is the emer-
gence of the spreads that eventually indicates and leads to stress to public finance. 
2   The yields are provided by Datastream. At every point in time, they calculate a yield curve via inter-
polation of existing yield/maturity combinations by cubic splines. The yields of an average AAA-
rated government bond of a country in the EMU are also provided by Datastream. 
3   For skewed data, the quantile of the normal distribution is not equivalent to the quantiles of the em-
pirical distribution. Using this definition thus keeps the number of crisis periods endogenous. 
4   For similar results obtained with two other crisis definitions we refer to the robustness analysis in 
section 7. 
5   For the latter see also Heise et al. (2010).  
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analyzed and combined to a scorecard (the so-called Euro Monitor), the three other pro-
posals do not contain any analysis on the performance of the proposed indicators. In 
fact, they are quite vague with respect to how they plan to establish a macroeconomic 
surveillance. The BMWi set contains five indicators: unit labor costs, current account 
balance, price level developments, unemployment rate, and private debt. The EC set 
contains seven indicators: government debt, current account balance, real effective ex-
change rates based on unit labor costs and GDP deflator, increases in real house prices, 
net foreign asset position, and ratio of private sector credit to GDP. The ECB set con-
tains ten indicators, subdivided into main indicators (four) and qualitative control indi-
cators (six). The former are: competitiveness indexes based on consumer prices, based 
on a GDP-deflator, and based on unit labor costs, as well as deviations from stability-
oriented wage developments. The latter include: indebtedness of public sector, external 
imbalances,  degree  of  convergence,  asset prices,  indebtedness  of private  sector,  and 
credit booms. The Heise set contains 15 indicators: government debt, government defi-
cit, government interest payments as share of government expenditure, required adjust-
ments in primary balances due to demographic change, unit labor costs, current account 
balance, export shares in global trade, domestic demand, unemployment rate, employ-
ment ratio, labor productivity, consumption of energy, private debt-to-GDP ratios for 
households and non-financial corporations, and net international investment position. 
To discuss the economic relevance of the indicators they can be grouped into five cate-
gories: fiscal indicators, competitiveness indicators, asset prices, labor market indica-
tors, and private and foreign debt indicators. For the matching of our indicators with that 
of the four sets and a description of sources and transformations of the indicators com-
pare the table in annex II.  
The variables of the first group, fiscal indicators, are an obvious candidate to signal po-
tential debt crises. They include measures of government debt, government deficits, and 
interest payments as share of government expenditure. It is proposed, that extraordinary 
high levels of debt, large deficits, and a relatively high share of interest payments might 
signal dangers for the sustainability of debt. All sets, except for the BMWi set, include 
fiscal indicators. One of the main reasons to develop the framework of macroeconomic 
surveillance was the assumption that it would not be sufficient to observe fiscal indica-
tors only. Therefore other groups of indicators are proposed. 
The second and largest group of indicators comprises competitiveness indicators. The 
idea behind choosing these indicators is, that in a currency union without the possibility 
of nominal devaluations the emergence of disadvantages in price competitiveness can-
not  be  easily  corrected  and  might  therefore,  by  erosion  of  the  tax  base  and  ever-
increasing spending on social security systems, lead to risks for debt crises. The group 
of indicators includes current account balances (in all sets) and trade shares (in Heise), 
whereas high deficits and declining shares would be interpreted as results of low or de-
clining competitiveness. Heise includes longer term developments of domestic demand, 
arguing that relying on trade surpluses might not be a sufficient long term strategy,  
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since growth and the tax base also depend on local developments. The group also in-
cludes constructed measures of competitiveness, which are real effective exchange rates 
based on different prices, e.g. consumer prices, GDP-deflators, and unit labor costs. De-
creasing competitiveness is expected to constitute a risk for debt sustainability. The 
constructed competitiveness measures are proposed by EC and ECB. Heise and BMWi 
in turn suggest looking directly at unit labor costs. Additionally, BMWi suggests consi-
dering consumer prices directly. Accordingly, high increases in unit labor costs or con-
sumer prices are expected to reduce competitiveness. 
The third group consists of asset prices as indicators of macroeconomic imbalances. The 
EC recommends looking at house prices, whilst the ECB more generally considers asset 
prices. Extraordinary increases in asset prices could be a valuable predictor of debt cris-
es, because they might indicate the emergence of a bubble that might in turn, if bursting, 
not only cause other forms of financial crises, such as banking crises, but might also 
lead to debt crises, e.g. because of government bail outs of banks, the growth effects due 
to banking crises or reduced collateral. We are including increases of property and asset 
price indices.6  
Labor market indicators build up the fourth group of indicators. They can be found in 
the sets of Heise and BMWi. Both of the sets use the unemployment rate as indicator, 
Heise includes additionally labor-force participation and labor productivity. Labor mar-
ket indicators might picture the flexibility of an economy to react to shocks and their 
longer term growth prospects. Thus, extraordinary high increases in unemployment, de-
creases in labor-force participation and labor productivity might signal risks for gov-
ernment’s budgets. 
The final group of indicators is private and foreign debt. All sets include a private debt 
indicator, but Heise subdivides it into household debt and debt of non-financial institu-
tions. We include all three. Extraordinary high levels of private debt might indicate a 
risk for public debt, because the government might be in charge to bail-out private debt 
in the case of crises, and because high levels of private debt might indicate a position in 
a financial cycle that is related to speculative investment (Minsky, 1972). Additionally 
to private debt, Heise and EC include net foreign assets. The indicator derives from ac-
cumulated current account deficits and shows the foreign indebtedness of a country. It is 
therefore not only an indicator of long-term competitiveness but also one of vulnerabili-
ty to withdrawals and forced reversals in the balance of payments.  
Some characteristics of the different sets include: The Heise set is the largest, but it does 
not cover asset prices and real exchange rates. The BMWi set is the smallest, but in-
cludes a relatively wide range of indicators, excluding only fiscal indicators. The EC set 
is small but covers all categories except for labor. The ECB set is similar to that of the 
                                                 
6   High decreases – a burst of a bubble – could also be a signal. But since countermeasures should be 
taken before the burst of a bubble, these signals are not very useful for policymakers.  
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EC, but has a stronger focus on competitiveness indices. Only two variables are in-
cluded in all set: current account balances and private debt measures.  
Whilst we were trying to include as many variables as possible from the proposed sets 
into our sample, we had to exclude a few due to unavailability of data at high enough 
frequency (at least quarterly) or because the description has been too broad. These in-
clude two variables from the set of Heise (required adjustment of primary balances due 
to demographic change and energy consumption) and three variables from the ECB set 
(deviations from stability oriented wage developments, degree of convergence, and cre-
dit booms). 
All remaining twenty variables are present either in monthly or quarterly frequency.7 
We drew the data from Eurostat, ECB and Datastream (including original data from the 
IMF, OECD, MSCI, ECB, and CPB). Most of the variables are transformed, e.g. ex-
pressed in terms of GDP or year over year changes are employed. For the details of the 
variable transformations see appendix A-1. 
4  Empirical Method 
The framework used to translate values of the different indicators   of macroeconomic 
imbalances into an early-warning system for public debt crises is the signals approach. 
We use – with small adaptations – the methodology as presented in Kaminsky, Lizondo 
and Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). We employ the signals ap-
proach because of its simplicity and its ability to allow for detecting the single signaling 
indicators even if a composite indicator is used. The idea behind the signals approach is 
that an indicator sends an early-warning signal in time   and country   when the indica-
tor value   
  exceeds a certain threshold   .8 The signals of the different indicators are 
then combined and condensed to one composite indicator that can be translated into 
pseudo-probabilities for the occurrence of a crisis. There are four questions that have to 
be answered before employing the signals approach: 
The first question is: How long is the early-warning horizon? In the literature, the hori-
zon before a crisis, in which signals should appear, ranges from 12 to 24 month. The 
suitability of the chosen horizon depends on the scope of the early-warning system. Our 
warning is aimed at the early identification of possible causes for difficulties with the 
servicing of government debt. Since we are concerned with longer-term developments 
and have to allow for policy reactions, we chose a comparably long early-warning hori-
zon of 24 months, as for example in Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). 
                                                 
7   Monthly data are obtained from quarterly using cubic interpolation. Where necessary, we calculated 
seasonally adjusted data using the berlin procedure. 
8   The indicator   can be viewed as the multi-country time series,   
  is the realization in time   and 
country  .  
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The second question is: Which data could be used for the calibration of the system? As 
in Detragiache, E. and Spilimbergo, A. (2001), we exclude periods up to four years after 
the outbreak of a crisis from our analysis. The implicit assumption is that being in a cri-
sis leads to a different behavior of the indicators compared to normal times or tranquil 
periods. For countries that did not experience a crisis in the observation period, we ex-
clude the last 24 month of our sample (01.05.2009 – 01.04.2011) from the calibration 
because we do not know if the now crisis-free countries will perhaps experience a crisis 
in the near future or not (and thus, if the indicators should signal now or not).  
The third question is: How is the threshold    determined? The indicator sends a signal 
of a crisis within the next 24 months if its value exceeds a certain threshold. As we build 
an  early-warning  system  for  one  currency  union,  we  use  uniform  thresholds  for  all 
countries for a given indicator (for example current account over GDP). We express the 
threshold as a quantile of the indicators empirical distribution (using only the time range 
defined above and all eleven countries). 
The determination of the threshold is crucial for the predictive power of the indicator. 
The prediction of an indicator is correct, if it is above the threshold before a crisis or if 
being below is not followed by a crisis in the next 24 months. Both, being above and be-
low the threshold, can be seen as a signal. However, we refer to a signal if an indicator 
value is above its threshold. As in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), we have four possible 
outcomes (states) of the indicator for every point in time as defined in table 1.9 
Table 1: 
Indicator State Definition. Different combinations of signals and the occurrence of a crisis. We 
abstract  for  convenience  from  sub-  and  superscripts  for  indicator   ,  time     and  country     
(  instead of   , 
  ,   instead of   
 ,   instead of   ). 
  Crisis within the next 24 months 
   = 1  
No crisis within the next 24 
months    = 0  
Signal issued    = 1        
No signal issued    = 0        
 
  is thus the number of months where a signal for a crisis was followed by a crisis in 
the next 24 months.   corresponds to the number of periods where a signal was not fol-
lowed by a crisis period, while   contains all periods without signal despite a following 
crisis.  , last but not least, is the number of months where the absence of a signal is fol-
lowed by 24 tranquil periods. States with correct signals are thus   and  , while those 
with erroneous (type II error) or missing (type I error) signals are   and  , respectively. 
                                                 
9   More technically, the table contains the number of periods that the indicator is in one of the four 
states depending on the level of the indicator and the occurrence of a crisis.  
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The share of type I errors to pre-crisis periods is 
 
   , the share of type II errors to tran-
quil periods is 
 
   . It is clear, that a low threshold will result in many signals (correct 
and wrong) and thus to possibly a high type II error probability, while a high threshold 
leads to few signals, but potentially missed crisis periods and thus a high type I error 
probability. In Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) the optimal threshold is deter-
mined such that the Noise-to-Signal Ratio (   ), the percentage of wrong signals over 
the percentage of correctly signalled crisis, is minimal: 
    = 
 
  +  
 
  +  
= 
 
  +  
1 −  
  +  
. 
An indicator is said to be acceptable, if      <  1. It can be seen, that this is equivalent 
to 
 
  +  
+
 
  +  
< 1. 
This is a setup where type I and type II errors are equally weighted. But the question if a 
missed crisis or a wrongly signaled one is worse, depends highly on the preferences of 
the political decision makers that found their actions on an early warning system. For a 
discussion of this topic, see for example Bussière and Fratzscher (2008). Instead of us-
ing the     in order to determine the optimal threshold, we use the same utility func-
tion as in Alessi and Detken (2011). The utility function for every indicator   contains 
the weighted loss of type I and type II error probabilities: 
      = min  ,1 −    −   
 
  +  
+  1 −   
 
  +  
 . 
As Alessi and Detken (2011) point out, an indicator is useful only if       > 0.10 
Because a crisis without a warning (type I error) will normally be more costly than 
preemptive action that is not followed by a crisis (type II error), one could argue, that   
should be bigger than 0.5. On the other hand, a decisionmaker may find type II errors 
more preferable because of the problematic justification of costly preemptive actions 
without a following crisis (a control mechanism is often only established after a crisis). 
Because of these opposing tendencies, we (as in Alessi and Detken (2011)) will work 
with a balanced risk aversion (   =  0.5) in this paper. For every indicator  , the optimal 
threshold is chosen as the quantile11 which maximizes    ∶=    0.5 . 
                                                 
10         = 0 is always achievable by regarding either every period as a signal (if type I errors are 
worse) or no period as a signal (if type II errors are worse). 
11   Between the 50% and 95% quantile of the empirical distribution of the indicator, steps in 1%.  
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The fourth question to be answered before employing the signals approach is: How can 
a composite indicator be constructed? For the assessment of the performance of the in-
dicator set as a whole, we condense the information contained in every single indicator 
into a composite indicator. The indicator   sends a signal, if its value is larger than the 
threshold (  
   >   ). We introduce a binary variable   for every indicator  , which is   
if a signal is issued and   otherwise: 
  , 
  = 1  
       =  1,      
   >   
0,           ℎ      
  
Different methods for the construction of a composite indicator have been proposed, for 
example in Kaminsky (1999) or Edison (2003). We will only use one of the different 
proposed methods and define the composite indicator    as the weighted average of all 
binary indicators. As weights, we use the (normed) utilities    of the different indicators 
  (setting the usefulness of an indicator with negative utility to  )12: 
   =
  
∑               
 
   
  =       , 
 
           
. 
In ECB (2010), we find the proposal that the early-warning system should work like a 
traffic light in three stages. This can be achieved using the composite indicator. Below a 
certain threshold, the composite indicator does not send a signal (green light). Above 
this threshold, a warning is issued (yellow light). The third level is reached, when a fur-
ther thorough and detailed analysis reveals that there are serious macroeconomic imbal-
ances that should be addressed in order to avoid a public debt crisis in the near future. 
Our analysis reported here is restricted to the differentiation between the green and the 
yellow phase. 
From the above elaborations it is straightforward that the utility of the single indicators 
is an appropriate measure of the quality of an indicator for signaling proposes. In addi-
tion we also consider the empirical probability of type I  
 
     and type II  
 
     errors 
as components of the utility function.  
However, not only these measures should be discussed, since the probability of type I 
and type II errors has a condition on the (non-)existence of a crisis. This can be seen on-
ly ex post. On the other hand, we might be interested in the ex ante probability of a cri-
sis conditional on having a signal. Because of this, we will discuss in addition to the 
utility of the indicators the following two measures: 
                                                 
12   Results obtained with equal and inverse NSR weights are presented in section 7.  
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        is the probability of a correctly signaled period (measured as the proportion of 
correct signals / no signals over all periods).     = 1|  = 1  =     = 1|  >     (or, 
in short:    |  ) is the probability of having a crisis now or within the next 24 months 
given the value of the indicator exceeds the threshold. For a good indicator, this meas-
ure should be monotonic increasing with   , because higher indicator values should be 
more likely to be followed by a crisis.  
Still, the two measures of ex ante probability shown above might be somehow impre-
cise, because policy makers want to know, what an actually observed composite indica-
tor value means. There will probably be a huge difference between a value of 0.4 and a 
value of 1 for the composite indicator (the latter meaning that all components of the in-
dicator sent a signal of existing imbalances). Because of this, we also take a look at 
   |   
   ∶=    |   ≤    
  <    , the probability of having a crisis within the next 24 
month  given  the  value  of  the  composite  indicator  is  in  a  predefined  interval,  with 
   ∈ {0,0.1,…,1}  and     =    + 0.1  (see  Edison  (2003),  Kaminsky  (1999),  Brügge-
mann and Linne (2002)).13 Like    |   this measure should monotonically increase 
with   .14 
As a further quality measure for composite indicators, using the estimated probabilities 
and the actual realizations of a crisis, we can calculate the quadratic probability score 
(   ) as described in Brüggemann and Linne (2002). The measure is essentially equiv-
alent to the mean squared error. It sums the quadratic differences between the probabili-
ty of a crisis within the next 24 months given the composite indicator value, and the ac-
tual outcome. Let    be the total number of periods that can be used for the calibration 
and quality assessment in country  . Then we have in analogy to Brier (1950) and Di-
ebold and Rudebusch (1989) the normalized sum over the squared differences between 
the probability of a crisis given a certain composite indicator value and the actual exis-
tence of a crisis at time   in country  . 
    =
1
∑     
  2        




     
. 
A lower     means a lower mismatch between probabilities and actual outcomes. 
With  the  above  description  of  the  signal  approach  and  the  introduction  of  different 
measures of quality for single indicators as well as for composite indicators we are able 
to present results for the four proposed indicator sets. 
                                                 
13   This probability can also be calculated for individual indicators, given proper intervals. Since only 
the composite indicators are constructed in a way that ensures values between 0 and 1, we do not ap-
ply this measure to individual indicators. 
14   Just as    |   =    |   >    can be interpreted as a complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion,     |   ≤     <      is  like  a  discrete  density  missing  a  scaling  factor.  The  “interval”  for 
   = 1 is, of course, only a point value.  
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5  Results 
We are presenting the results of our analysis in two parts. We first lay out the results of 
quality tests of single indicators, which is followed by the same exercise for the pro-
posed composite indicators. In the next section we are then considering our own com-
posite indicator.  
The different indicator sets contain a total of 25 indicators, of which we use a total of 
20. For each one, we calculate an optimal threshold, which results in the partition of the 
indicator in the four different states described above. The resulting utilities are then 
used to construct a composite indicator for every of the four indicator sets. We are now 
comparing the individual indicators. The analysis relies on the above described perfor-
mance measures: utility, type I and type II error, probability of a correct crisis forecast, 
probability of correct forecast of crisis and non-crisis periods. . The results are summa-
rized in table 2.  
We can see, that higher optimal thresholds tend to produce more missed signals or a 
higher probability of type I errors, while lower thresholds go along with a higher share 
of type II errors. We see also, that indicators with a higher utility tend to be better at the 
other quality measures. A counterexample is domestic demand, that is an average indi-
cator regarding    |  , while having a low utility. This can be explained by the fact, 
that domestic demand has a very high share of missed crisis, while sending nearly no 
false signals. The same holds true (to a lesser extent) for unit labor cost and foreign as-
sets. At last, we see that the share of correctly signaled periods as share of all periods is 
mostly below the probability of not having a crisis (94%).15  
We also see that some indicators perform very well, whilst others do not even yield a 
positive utility, and hence have no worth in forecasting a crisis in our sample. We are 
discussing the performance of the indicators by looking at the five groups defined in 
section 3.  
The first group comprises the fiscal indicators, including government deficit, debt and 
interest payments. Government deficit (as share of GDP) is the best of the three indica-
tors for coming crises and also the best indicator of the whole set of indicators consi-
dered. Government debt (as share of GDP) is lagging behind, as it is the accumulation 
of deficits. In both cases, signals are either given over most of the observation period 
(Greece for government debt and deficit; Italy and Belgium for government debt) or 
they start after the financial crisis. It is remarkable, that the calculated optimal thre-
sholds are not too far from the limits given by the SGP (71% as a debt and 5.09% as 
deficit criterion). The interest payments as share of total government expenditure do not 
                                                 
15   For utility, the probability of type I and II errors have equal weight. A wrong signal ( ) has a much 
lower share in the utility than a missed signal ( ) due to sheer number of non-crisis periods. For the 
proportion of correctly signaled periods, the absolute number of wrong signals is relevant.   
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send any valid signals, because interest rates were declining (and converging) during 
most of the time since the introduction of the Euro leading to ever lower interest rates 
for newly issued debt and, until beginning 2008, declining shares of interest payments 
in almost all countries. 
Table 2: 
Different quality measures, sorted by utility.  













 +   




    |    





 + + +   
Government deficit  0.4315  87%  0.0700  0.0669  0.5225  0.9328 
Unemployment rate  0.3771  93%  0.2200  0.0258  0.6610  0.9625 
Non-MFI debt  0.3367  88%  0.2500  0.0766  0.4032  0.9123 
Household debt  0.3318  84%  0.2500  0.0864  0.5208  0.8954 
Current account  0.3241  68%  0.0707  0.2812  0.1752  0.7315 
Private debt  0.3153  84%  0.2500  0.1193  0.3024  0.8723 
Unit labor cost  0.2506  86%  0.3900  0.1088  0.2711  0.8738 
Foreign asset  0.1926  78%  0.4100  0.2048  0.1838  0.7803 
Trade share  0.1861  85%  0.5000  0.1279  0.2008  0.8496 
Labor-force participation  0.1858  64%  0.3000  0.3284  0.1639  0.6740 
Labor productivity  0.1620  50%  0.2000  0.4759  0.1189  0.5446 
Domestic demand  0.1506  90%  0.6200  0.0788  0.2714  0.8824 
Government debt  0.0865  71%  0.5500  0.2769  0.1187  0.7021 
ULC-competitiveness   0.0471  89%  0.8000  0.1058  0.0909  0.8593 
Inflation  0.0319  91%  0.8500  0.0861  0.1007  0.8678 
HICP-competitiveness  -0.0163  95%         
GDP-deflator-compet.  -0.0263  95%         
Interest payments  -0.0269  95%         
Asset prices   -0.0267  95%         
Property prices   -0.0273  95%         
Source: own calculations. Note: For the indicators with negative utility, the other measures are not shown, 
since there is no optimal threshold.  
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The second group of indicators comprises competitiveness indicators including unit la-
bor costs, current account, trade share, domestic demand, HIPC-, GDP deflator-, and 
ULC-competitiveness, as well as inflation. The unit labor costs indicator seems, on first 
sight, to be fairly useful. But, contrary to other indicators with comparable utility (pri-
vate debt and foreign assets), the wrong signals are not concentrated in the crisis coun-
tries  directly  before  our  signaling  period,  but  are  rather  equally  distributed  over  all 
countries and times. Additionally, in comparison there are a lot of missed signals in pre-
crisis periods. This arises from our choice of yearly changes of the unit labor cost index. 
A high increase in one period followed by a stable development or slow decrease in 
subsequent periods might not lead to problems, while the same high increase, followed 
by further increases, might. The current account indicator, on the other hand, is a very 
good indicator, that sends wrong signals (type II errors) mostly in the crisis countries, 
while countries that did not experience a crisis have positive or only slightly negative 
balances over the whole observation period. Overall, only Portugal, Greece and Spain 
have reported current account deficits for the whole observed period. Ireland, on the 
other hand, had a positive current account balance until mid 2004. Then it turns nega-
tive. Other countries with current account surpluses over the whole period are Germany, 
Austria, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium (with a current account deficit during the 
financial crisis). For France and Italy, we observe slight surpluses in 1999 and a steady 
slow decline to small deficits in 2010. The current account indicator shows a higher util-
ity but a lower probability of forecasting correct crisis and non-crisis periods as com-
pared to the trade share indicator. The change in the share of world trade (exports) is a 
rather mean indicator in terms of utility. Basically, the problems with the trade shares 
are the same as with unit labor costs. Signals are sent nearly equally distributed over 
time and all countries. There are two main periods where all countries lost significant 
shares of world trade: after the introduction of the Euro until 2002 and during the finan-
cial crisis, where trade as a whole declined, but more so in the developed countries than 
in the rest of the world. This indicator is more dependent on the general competitiveness 
of the Euro area in the world and not on the country-specific imbalances compared to 
other countries in the Euro area. Another indicator of the group is domestic demand. 
The countries within the EMU having the strongest increase in domestic demand over 
most of the time have been Ireland, Spain and Greece (in that order). However, starting 
with  the  financial  crisis,  the  development  slowed  down  significantly,  leading  to  the 
three lowest growth rates (declines, especially for Ireland) end of 2010. Because of this 
divided picture, neither low increases of domestic demand (signaling weak economic 
growth or even stagnation) nor high increases (signaling possible funding through high 
current account deficits) can be used as an indicator yielding results comparable to the 
best indicators. However, the utility of the domestic demand indicator is still positive. 
This does not hold true for all of the competitiveness indexes based on different price 
indices. The indicators are calculated from effective exchange rates that are deflated by 
either consumer prices (HICP), the GDP deflator or unit labor costs (ULC) and are pro- 
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vided by the ECB. We analyze the yearly development of the indices.16 The results are 
not encouraging. First, the development of the indicators seems to depend strongly on 
the development of the Euro. This is especially true for the ones that are deflated by 
HICP and GDP. The nominal depreciation of the Euro after 1999, and afterwards an ap-
preciation can be observed in the data. This dependence leads to a strong comovement 
of the indicator development across countries. The strongest increases of the three indi-
cators are observed after the burst of the new economy bubble. Before the current fiscal 
crisis, only few signals were sent by the indicator deflated by ULC, no signals were sent 
by the two other indicators, leading to a negative utility for the indicators that are def-
lated by HICP and GDP. The final indicator in the group of competitiveness indicators 
is inflation. Most signals of high inflation were sent in and after 2001, when it spiked 
due a variety of price shocks, see Gregoriou, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2011), and 
only some (mostly in Greece and Spain) during the financial crisis. Because of this, in-
flation doesn’t seem to be a good indicator for the current public debt crises. At least, it 
has a slightly positive utility because of the few correct signals of high inflation in 
Greece before the outbreak of the current public debt crisis. 
The third group of indicators are asset prices. We look at high asset and property price 
increases as they are signs of developing bubbles. These indicators are particularly una-
ble to predict the current crises within a time horizon of 24 months because of two facts. 
Firstly, the highest increases were observed before and during the new economy bubble 
(as well as the highest declines of asset prices afterwards). Furthermore, the second pe-
riod of high increases in asset and property prices ended with the financial crisis in the 
beginning of 2008 (residential property prices even earlier). This means, that it took 
more than two years from the burst of a bubble through different transmission mechan-
isms to a public debt crisis. Another problem might be that asset prices have a high co-
linearity because of the interdependency of financial markets. This means that it might 
be difficult to identify a problem for a single member country based on extremely high 
asset price increases.  
The third group of indicators consists of three measures of the labor market, namely the 
unemployment rate, labor force participation, and labor productivity. We looked at the 
absolute change of the unemployment rate from one year’s month to the next year’s 
month. A strong increase in the unemployment rate leads to problems for public fin-
ances. This effect could especially be observed in Ireland and Spain, where declines in 
construction investment lead to recessions (Lane (2011), Suarez (2010)) and an increase 
in the unemployment rate from 4.5% (June 2007) to 13.6% (June 2010) in Ireland17 and 
                                                 
16   As they are normalized in 1999, absolute values do not capture the initial differences of the countries 
at the introduction of the Euro. Because values are (qua definition) all close to the normalization val-
ue in the time around 1999, the detection of a crisis around 1999 would theoretically be possible, but 
very difficult in practice. 
17   5.9% in June 2008 at the beginning of the warning period.  
IWH   __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH Discussion Paper 12/2011 
20
8.0% to 20.2% in Spain18 for the same time period. Since June 2010, the unemployment 
rates in both countries have been fairly stable. The unemployment rate is the second 
best performing single early indicator for debt crisis in our sample. The labor-force par-
ticipation rate and labor productivity are not performing that well but still yield positive 
utility. These indicators (yearly percentage change of labor-force participation rate and 
average change of labor productivity in the course of the last 5 years) have the two low-
est thresholds.19 This means, that a lot of signals will be sent – including a lot of false 
ones. Both indicators send these false signals over the whole time period and in all 
countries. Additionally, one cannot even deduce the more crisis-prone countries from 
the others by the level of the indicator, if a signal is sent. Belgium and Italy, for exam-
ple, have both to fight relatively high losses in the labor-force participation rate. Italy 
has the strongest decline in labor productivity at most times. This does not necessarily 
mean that the indicator is useless, since Italy is frequently included in sets of crisis 
countries (PIIGS instead of PIGS), and Belgium could probably be one of the candi-
dates, if the public debt crisis could not be contained and would spread over the rest of 
the EMU.20  
The final group of indicators comprises private and foreign debt indicators, namely pri-
vate debt, household and non-MFI debt, as well as foreign assets. For almost all coun-
tries in the EMU, the share of private debt to GDP has risen since the introduction of the 
Euro. This increase was particularly strong in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the Nether-
lands, while Greek private debt only increased strongly after the emergence of the crisis 
(and the corresponding drop in output). Already in 2004, the levels of private debt be-
came somewhat alarming, especially in Ireland and the Netherlands, meaning that warn-
ings of possible problems generated by the transmission from private to public debt are 
issued much earlier in some countries. All three private debt indicators perform well. 
The performance of the foreign asset indicator on the contrary is rather mean. This indi-
cator (as share of GDP) is the accumulation of the current account balances and shows 
the divergence in the EMU caused by consistently different current accounts. While the 
German net foreign asset position increased from 10% of GDP in 1999 to 70% in 2010, 
Italy stays close to 0% (between -1% and 5%). The strongest development has Portugal, 
where foreign assets valuing 10% of GDP in 1999 developed to foreign debt of almost 
30% of GDP in the beginning of 2007. Most countries (Portugal is an exception) having 
current account surpluses, and thus accumulating foreign assets already started with a 
higher net foreign asset position in 1999. Because of that, the indicator does not offer 
much new insight compared to the current account balance. 
As can already be noted from the elaborations above, there are four different causes for 
false signals in our data. The burst of the new-economy bubble lead to a period of ma-
                                                 
18   11.0% in June 2008 at the beginning of the warning period. 
19   Expressed as quantiles of the empirical distribution.  
20   One of the robustness tests presented in section 6 includes different crises definitions, where we treat 
Italy as a crisis country.  
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croeconomic imbalances in some areas of the economy. The corresponding indicators 
(for example asset prices, trade shares) normally have two blocks of periods where most 
signals are sent. Another reason for false signals may be that some macroeconomic im-
balances may need more than two years (and another external shock) to materialize into 
problems with public debt, if they do not become too large. A good example for this 
type of false signal is given by government deficits and current account balances. They 
could thus be used as “very early warning indicators”, while other indicators, like infla-
tion, sent their signals only a very short time directly before and during a crisis.21 The 
third cause for false signals seems to be more or less random, affecting all countries at 
all times. Imbalances occur only for one or two periods and then disappear again – 
meaning, that they are much harder to explain than other causes of false signals. The 
last cause of wrong signals concerns the competitiveness indicators whose development 
shows a lot of comovement that depends on the exchange rate of the Euro. The signals 
of these indicators rather reflect the strength of the Euro than imbalances inside the 
EMU. 
In ECB (2010), a strong focus is put on the point that ideally one indicator should be 
enough for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. The goal of a single indica-
tor can of course be achieved by the usage of  a composite indicator, which can be 
created as described in section 4 for every one of the different indicator sets. The result-
ing four composite indicators differ because of the differences of the four sets as de-
scribed in section 3. The results are presented below.  
From the analysis of individual indicators it is intuitive that the success of a composite 
indicator depends on the number and diversity of individual indicators used in its con-
struction. The same becomes even more evident when looking at quality measures of 
the composite indicators. As every other indicator, the composite indicator can be eva-
luated in terms of signals for an upcoming crisis or tranquil periods. As possible thre-
sholds, we choose values in {0,0.1,0.2,…,0.9,1}, which is equivalent to the scoreboard 
as presented in Heise (2011). As the optimal threshold for all composite indicators, we 
choose     = 0.422. We derive this value by looking at the utilities at different thre-
sholds as shown in Figure 1.  
                                                 
21   It can be argued, that the term “false” signal is misleading at that point since the signals are basically 
correct – they are just sent too early. This might give rise to further analysis of an early warning sys-
tem with varying early-warning horizons for different indicators. 
22   This threshold is optimal for the Heise indicator and nearly so for the BMWi indicator (as the two 
fairly balanced and stable sets). Thus, it is an approximation of the real optimal value. This would 
theoretically be 0.5, if type I and II errors would be independently distributed over time. Since we 
expect especially for the pre-crisis periods increasing values of the composite indicator (and thus 
time-dependency), the optimal threshold lowers. The choice of 0.4 is founded on the results of the 
larger indicator sets having a more stable development of the composite indicator.   
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Figure 1: 
Utility of the composite indicators of the different sets at different thresholds 
Utility of the composite indicators of the different sets at different thresholds
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In Figure 2, we show the probability of correct crisis forecasts (   |  ) for different 
thresholds. We can see the expected monotonic development of    |   very good for 
the Heise indicator, but also (partly) for the BMWi indicator.23 These two are also the 
only indicators reaching probability values above 90%, while the ECB indicator ap-
proaches the probability    |   of private debt (30%).  
Figure 2: 
Probability of correct crisis forecasts (   |  ) of the composite indicators of the differ-
ent sets at different thresholds (a signal being issued for values of the composite indica-
tor above the threshold) 
 
 
   
                                                 
23 Due to the small number of indicators for all sets but the Heise set, the indicator does not show the 
theoretically expected monotonic increase.  
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Figure 3 shows the estimated probabilities of a crisis given the values of the composite 
indicator are in a certain interval.24 We can see that for the Heise and BMWi sets indi-
cator values of 0.4 or above correspond with a probability for a debt crisis within the 
next 24 months above the unconditional probability. For values of 0.6 or higher this be-
comes true for the EC indicator as well. 
Figure 3: 
Probability of a crisis, given the values of the composite indicator in a certain interval 
(   |   
  ) of the composite indicators of the different sets 
 
 
From the results presented in figure 3, we can calculate the quadratic probability score 
(QPS) as a summary measure of the quality of the composite indicator given indicator 
intervals. The quadratic probability score (where a lower value is more favorable) is 
presented in table 3 together with utility, probability of correct crisis forecasts and prob-
ability of a correctly signaled crisis and non-crisis periods. 
                                                 
24   The calculated probabilities are independent of country   and time  , they only depend on the actual 
value of the composite indicator.  
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Table 3: 
Quality measures with     = 0.4 for composite indicators of the four different sets, cal-
culated using utility weights.  
Composite indicator  BMWi  ECB  EC  Heise 
Utility  0.4233  0.3194  0.3440  0.4660 
Probability of correct crisis forecast 
    |      37.11%  30.24%  20.31%  62.18% 
Probability of correct crisis/non-crisis 
period forecast  
   
          89.98%  88.04%  77.72%  96.26% 
Quadratic probability score (      0.0393  0.0903  0.0668  0.0234 
 
Table 3 shows that the broad indicator from Heise (2011) is extremely good at all dif-
ferent quality measures. Especially the measure    |   will be of interest for the poli-
cy-maker: in our sample and given the composite indicator exceeds the value of 0.4, a 
crisis within the next 24 months occurred with a probability of only 20% in the EC set, 
but with a probability of 62% for the Heise composite indicator.  
A closer look at the composition and performance of the different composite indicators 
provides the following picture. The composite indicator of BMWi is fairly balanced 
among the different groups of indicators. We can observe low, but not critical values for 
the composite indicator in many countries. These values only rise before and during the 
financial crisis. However, one main feature stands out: There is a long history of higher 
values (0.4 – 0.7) for Greece, Portugal and Ireland. The composite indicator of ECB has 
been constructed from all three competitiveness indicators, public and private debt and 
asset prices. Three of these indicators have a weight of 0 due to negative utility. This 
leaves private debt with a share of 70% in the composite indicator. 25 The composite in-
dicator is thus nearly a bivariate signal of private debt. Because of the low number of 
valid indicators (3) and the concentration on one of them, the proposed signals approach 
is possibly not the best way to achieve signals from this set. As private debt levels in 
Greece are low until beginning of 2007 and only slowly rising until the beginning of 
2010, a detection of the crisis in Greece is not possible with this indicator. On the other 
hand, signals are issued over a long time in the Netherlands, since private debt levels 
move around the threshold since 2001. The composite indicator of EC is actually built 
on five indicators, because the competitiveness indicator, based on HICP, and property 
prices have negative utility. Private debt, current account balance and net foreign asset 
position contribute a total of 86% to the indicator. Thus, the indicator is fairly imba-
lanced, though by far not as badly as the one proposed by the ECB. We can observe 
high indicator values in Spain and Portugal over most of the observation period. In Irel-
and, the indicator starts to increase in 2004 and stays among the highest values from 
                                                 
25  Government Debt has a share of approximately 20%, the remaining 10% are covered by the compe-
titiveness index, based on ULC.  
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2005 onwards. Other strong signals are sent for Italy, while Greece (due to its low pri-
vate and foreign debts) stays at around 0.4 for most of the time until mid 2007, when 
they start to increase as well. The composite indicator of Heise has the largest and most 
diversified indicator set which tries to find a balance between four different areas of the 
economy. This leads to a broad range of possible values and, in general, nearly no zero 
values of the indicator. Comparable to the indicator of the BMWi, we can observe low 
indicator values until mid 2001 (with persistent deviations in Greece, Portugal, and pos-
sibly Italy and Spain). After a turbulent period following the burst of the new economy 
bubble (with most countries staying under a value of 0.3), we observe the long tranquil 
period until 2007. In this period, Ireland starts to build up imbalances, while for exam-
ple Germany reduces them. During and after the financial crisis, all countries have in-
creasing indicator values, while the mark of 0.4 is only crossed persistently by Ireland, 
Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy (in that order). 
6  A Proposal for a  ew Composite Indicator 
In the previous section, we described the performance of individual indicators and of the 
composite indicators obtained from the four different sets (using utility weights). It be-
came clear from table 3, that composite indicators calculated from larger and more di-
verse sets have better quality measures. This was probably due to the fact that imbal-
ances showed up in nearly all different areas of the economy (captured by the five dif-
ferent categories of individual indicators). But the origin of future imbalances laying a 
foundation to possible crises is unknown. Because of this, a composite indicator built on 
a broad set of individual indicators will most likely (on average) be better than any 
composite indicator based on a small set. Using a large set means that fewer imbalances 
escape the eyes of the observer. 
Therefore, we propose a composite indicator       based on all individual indicators.26 
We will calculate this indicator both using utility and equal weights of 
 
 ,   being the 
number of indicators Kaminsky (1999). The intuitive argument for an equally weighted 
composite indicator is again the ignorance as to the origins of future crises. The utility 
weighted composite indicator might just not give enough weight to the area where the 
next imbalances build up.27 We show the indicators in figure 4 and 5 (the former shows 
the indicator based on utility, the latter the one based on equal weights).  
                                                 
26   We only exclude the competitiveness indicator based on the GDP deflator because of its similarity to 
the one based on CPI. This way, we can keep a certain balance between the five categories. The 
whole set thus contains 19 indicators: the set of Heise (as we analyze it here) and additionally: com-
petitiveness indicators based on CPI and ULC, private debt, inflation, asset and property prices. 
27   This solves at least partly the problem of overfitting: until now, we deducted our probabilities in a way 
that was optimal for the past. Using equal weights relaxes this restriction at least for the composite in-
dicator. However, we do not change the (utility-optimal) threshold of the individual indicators. Indica-
tors with a negative utility are counted as well and are evaluated at the 94%-quantile of the empirical 
distribution, corresponding to the unconditional probability of a crisis in the past, which was 6.04%.  
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As could be expected, the highest values for the indicator based on equal weights do not 
exceed 0.75.28 The  crisis  countries send warnings of  a possible  crisis (indicated by 
shaded bars) continuously since the financial crisis, Greece also in 2001 and 2002, di-
rectly after the introduction of the Euro. Other countries getting warnings during the 
height of the financial crisis are Italy, France, the Netherlands and Belgium (the latter 
only for the equally weighted indicator). 
We can compare the performance of our composite indicator to the best performing 
composite indicator proposed by other authors, namely the Heise indicator. Due to the 
larger set of individual indicators, we would expect the following from a composite in-
dicator: First, the utility, but also the other quality measures should be better (or at least 
comparable because of statistical uncertainty) to the ones of the 4 different composite 
indicators. Second, the utility function should have only one local (and global) maxi-
mum. Third, both the functions    |   =     = 1|   
  >      and    |   
   should 
be monotonic increasing with     and   , respectively. 
Figure 6: 
Utility of the composite indicators       (utility and equal weights) and from the Heise 
set. 
 
                                                 
28  5 out of of 19 indicators are excluded in the utility weighted indicator set due to negative utility, but 
fully counted in the equally weighted composite indicator. This leads to this strong reduction of indi-
cator values.  
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In figures 6 to 8 we show the utility, the probability of correct crisis forecasts     |    
and the probability of having a crisis within the next 24 month given the value of the 
composite indicator is in a predefined interval    |   
   for the three indicators (      
(utility and equal weights) and the Heise indicator). We find that the main difference 
between the Heise indicator and utility weighted       is that the latter is more stable. 
The equally weighted indicator, however, reaches its maximal utility already at a thre-
shold of 0.3 (compared to 0.4 for the others). This faster increase is due to the lower 
values of the indicator mentioned above. The same feature can also be observed for 
   |   and    |   
   in figures 7 and 8. Because of this, we propose 0.3 as a threshold 
for      , based on equal weights.  
In addition to this general comparability to the Heise indicator, the two indicators show 
the expected three attributes. 
Figure 7: 
Probability of correct crisis forecasts     |    for the composite indicators       (utili-
ty and equal weights) and from the Heise set. 
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Figure 8: 
Probability of having a crisis within the next 24 month given the value of the composite 
indicator is in a predefined interval     |   
    for the composite indicators       (utili-
ty and equal weights) and from the Heise set. 
 
 
We already see from the above figures that both composite indicators are not too differ-
ent from the Heise indicator. This result is found again if we look at the different per-
formance measures in table 4. There is, however, one astounding results to be found in 
these measures. Moving from utility weights to equal weights, we would expect espe-
cially the maximal utility to go down, because high performing indicators get then the 
same weight as low performing indicators. The near-equal utility (at the maxima) points 
to both the high quality of the equally weighted indicator       and the stability of the 
result.  
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Table 4: 
Quality measures at optimal thresholds for composite indicators, calculated from all in-
dividual indicators using utility and equal weights. Measures using a threshold of 0.4 for 
      based on equal weights given for comparison. 
     , Utility 
     , Equal 
(       = 0.3  
     , Equal 
(       = 0.4  
Utility  0.4507  0.4492  0.3855 
Probability of correct crisis forecast 
(   |  )  61.04%  50.00%  84.78% 
Probability of correct crisis/non-crisis 
period forecast (
   
       )  96.01%  93.96%  97.83% 
Quadratic probability score (   )  0.0288  0.0349  0.0349 
 
Because the indicator      , based on equal weights, avoids (at least partly) the problem, 
that its measured performance is only a past performance while still obtaining similar 
results to its utility weighted counterpart, we propose this indicator as a system to moni-
tor macroeconomic imbalances in the EMU. 
7  Robustness Analysis 
In this section we test if our results are stable under different specifications. In a first 
part the reaction of individual indicators to different crisis definitions as mentioned in 
section 2 are tested. This test should establish that the imbalances we found to be valid 
under the crisis definition used above are really the problems that lead to the current 
public debt crisis in some countries of the EMU. In a second part we will present results 
for exogenous (politically determined) thresholds for some indicators, namely the crite-
ria of the SGP for public debt and deficit as well as the inflation target of the ECB. Until 
now, the thresholds were calculated in a utility-maximizing way. The results obtained 
with these thresholds can be strengthened further if they do not differ too much from 
those obtained by using fixed thresholds. In a third part we present the performance of 
the composite indicators of the different sets, given different weighting schemes. This 
way we can further strengthen the argument that an equally weighted composite indica-
tor may be much better for the detection of a future crisis while still not losing too much 
explanatory content for the past.  
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Effect of different crisis definitions 
We could have a problem with endogeneity, meaning that the quality of the individual 
indicators depends too strongly on the crisis definition. Then different definitions of 
crises (resulting in different starting dates and slightly differing crisis countries) should 
result in strongly differing optimal thresholds. We point out that this is not the case. It 
will be seen that the signals sent by the individual indicators in most cases do not de-
pend on the exact timing of a crisis. This leads to the conclusion that indeed the ob-
served imbalances are the reason for the current debt crises in several countries of the 
EMU. Two alternative crisis definitions, as already mentioned in section 2, are: 
1)  A crisis occurs if the spread   
  =   
  −   
    > 94.7   exceeds the 95%-quantile 
of the empirical distribution of  , see Pescatori and Sy (2004)29. This definition 
leads to earlier crisis dates and an additional country with an occurring crisis: It-
aly. 
2)  A crisis occurs in the month, where the IMF approved non-concessional loans in 
excess of 100% of quota to that country, Manasse and Roubini (2008). This de-
finition leads to only three crisis countries with very late occurrences, since (un-
til the time of writing) only Greece, Ireland and Portugal applied for IMF loans. 
In table 5, we list the beginnings of crises in the affected countries, including the stan-
dard definition used until now.30 Table 6 presents the optimal thresholds and corres-
ponding utilities for the different individual indicators given the three different crisis de-
finitions.  
Table 5: 
Beginning of crises with different crises definitions. 
  Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Spain  Italy 
Standard  01.01.2010  01.06.2010  01.07.2010  01.06.2010   
Quantile  01.11.2008  01.02.2009  01.05.2010  01.06.2010  01.06.2010 
IMF loans  01.05.2010  01.12.2010  01.05.2011     
 
                                                 
29  Due to extreme outcomes, the 90%-quantile of a gamma distribution fitted to the data contains the 
95%-quantile of the empirical distribution in its 95%-confidence interval. Pescatori and Sy (2004) 
show that their chosen crisis measure corresponds as well to the 90%-quantile of their dataset. 
30  The reason for Portugal having a crisis one month after Spain after the standard definition and one 
month before using the quantile definition is due to Portuguese spreads lying very close to, but be-
low the standard threshold in May and June 2010.  
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Table 6: 
Utilities and optimal thresholds of the individual indicators for different crises defini-
tions in comparison. 
  Utility  Optimal threshold 
 
Crisis Definition  Standard  Quantile  IMF loans  Standard  Quantile  IMF loans 
Government deficit  0.4315  0.3338  0.4900  87%  83%  93% 
Unemployment rate  0.3771  0.2334  0.3747  93%  85%  91% 
Non-MFI debt  0.3367  0.2666  0.2894  88%  89%  91% 
Household debt  0.3318  0.2629  0.2920  84%  86%  91% 
Current account  0.3241  0.3677  0.2692  68%  68%  58% 
Private debt  0.3153  0.2406  0.2590  84%  84%  85% 
Unit labor cost  0.2506  0.2127  0.2306  86%  68%  86% 
Foreign asset  0.1926  0.2475  0.1008  78%  67%  80% 
Trade share  0.1861  0.1318  0.1844  85%  94%  78% 
Labor-force participation  0.1858  0.2027  0.1843  64%  65%  89% 
Labor productivity  0.1620  0.0991  0.1560  50%  74%  51% 
Domestic demand  0.1506  0.1396  0.2661  90%  87%  92% 
Government debt  0.0865  0.1329  0.2528  71%  84%  70% 
ULC-competitiveness   0.0471  0.1109  0.0100  89%  66%  90% 
Inflation  0.0319  0.0828  0.0234  91%  66%  91% 
HICP-competitiveness  -0.0163  0.0356  -0.0265  95%  70%  95% 
GDP-deflator-
competitiveness  -0.0263  0.0562  -0.0258  95%  56%  95% 
Interest payments  -0.0269  -0.0278  -0.0263  95%  95%  95% 
Asset prices   -0.0267  -0.0274  -0.0261  95%  95%  95% 
Property prices   -0.0273  -0.0282  -0.0266  95%  95%  95% 
 
We see that indeed optimal indicator thresholds do hardly depend on the different crisis 
definitions. There are, however, some exceptions. We find dampened signals towards 
the end of the observation period inducing lower optimal thresholds for the crisis defini-
tion using IMF loans (GDP-competitiveness and asset prices for Portugal, current ac-
count for Ireland). We also find effects on indicators which perform better than average  
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in the countries that are in- or excluded, depending on the crisis definition. Labor-force 
participation does not send many signals in Spain. With the crisis definition of IMF 
loans, this results in much higher optimal thresholds. Inflation and foreign assets are 
better in Italy than in the other crises countries, leading to much lower optimal thre-
sholds with crises defined by quantiles. 
As we find that the optimal thresholds of the indicators do not depend on the crisis defi-
nition, we can deduce that the indicators chosen in the four analyzed proposals indeed 
reflect macroeconomic imbalances amounting to risks for the stability of public debt as 
presented by the utilities in table 2. 
Exogenous thresholds 
As an alternative to the endogenously defined optimal thresholds, one could also use 
exogenously given thresholds, e.g. for reasons of simplicity or transparency. Such thre-
sholds exist for government deficit (3%) and government debt (60%) in the SGP, and 
for inflation (2%)31 as a target of the ECB. In table 7, we compare the performance for 
these three indicators using standard (optimized utility in the standard crisis definition) 
thresholds and the exogenously defined ones. We see, that the optimal thresholds are 
much lower, especially the optimal quantiles of public debt and price development are 
below 50% (meaning, that in more than 54% of the periods signals would be sent). Cor-
respondingly, utility and probability of a crisis given a signal    |   are lower for all 
three indicators. However, the rules of the SGP and of the ECB are concerned with the 
long-term stability. The proposals for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances are 
concerned with the medium-term occurrence of a crisis, thus they should sent signals at 
more critical values. 
Table 7: 




Threshold  Utility 
Probability of cor-
rect crisis forecast 



















Government deficit  87%  65%  5.09%  3.00%  0.43154  0.33961  52.25%  20.42% 
Government debt  71%  46%  71.01%  60.00%  0.08653  0.04883  11.87%  8.94% 
Inflation  91%  46%  3.84%  2.00%  0.03194 
-
0.10360  10.07%  3.88% 
 
                                                 
31  We approximate the target of below but close to 2 % by 2 %.  
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Different weighting schemes 
The final robustness check concerns the construction of the composite indicators. In 
section 6 we already used equal weights for the composite indicator, based on all indi-
vidual indicators. Here, we are going to present the composite indicators of the four 
proposed sets, weighted equally and by inverse noise-to-signal ratio (NSR). The idea 
behind the usage of equal weights – as described above – is the uncertainty about the 
origins of future crisis.  The reason for testing  weights  according to inverse NSR is 
slightly different. We established in section 3 the comparability of NSR and utility. 
Thus, there should not be huge differences between the composite indicators based on 
these measures.32 
Table 8 contains the utility, the probability of a crisis given a signal    |  , the share 
of  correctly  signaled  periods 
   
         and  the  quadratic  probability  score  for  both 
weighting schemes and the four composite indicators. For the equally weighted compo-
site indicator, we find comparable results for the BMWi and Heise set. These two sets 
incorporate indicators with quite balanced utilities, leading to a small difference to the 
utility  weighted  composite  indicators.  There  are  huge  differences  especially  for  the 
ECB, but also for the EC set, since these sets include most of the individual indicators 
with negative utility (competitiveness indicators, asset and property prices). Since these 
are fully included in the equally weighted composite indicator, they are responsible for 
the large drop in utility – reaching even negative utility for the ECB set.33 On the other 
hand,  for  the  composite  indicator,  based  on  inverse  NSR-weights,  the  significant 
changes are to be found in the BMWi and Heise indicator. The difference originates in 
the now huge share of the unemployment rate (Heise: 34% compared to 13%, BMWi: 
60% compared to 29% in the utility weighted indicator) as a component of the compo-
site indicators. As can be seen in table 2, the unemployment rate has by far the lowest 
share of type-II errors, leading to an extremely high inverse NSR. This decreases utility 
of the composite indicators, but increases strongly the probability of a crisis given a sig-
nal (since the indicator of unemployment rate rarely sends false signals). 
                                                 
32  There will be differences in case of low type-II errors (denominator of the inverse NSR), since this 
results in extremely (in the limit infinitely) high weights. 
33  Arguably, the highest utility for the ECB indicator using equal weights is reached at a threshold of 
0.1 and not at 0.4 due to the huge number of missing signals at larger thresholds. We present here the 
figures for a threshold of 0.4 for reasons of comparability.  
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Table 8: 
Different quality measures for the composite indicators of the proposed sets, calculated 
using equal and inverse-NSR weights 
Weights  BMWi  ECB  EC  Heise 
Utility 
equal  0.4410  -0.0138  0.2194  0.4341 
inverse NSR  0.3710  0.3194  0.3802  0.4054 
Probability of correct crisis 
forecast (   |  )  
equal  41.45%  2.63%  27.18%  58.33% 
inverse NSR  73.08%  30.24%  35.68%  73.45% 
Probability of correct  
crisis/non-crisis period 
forecast (
   
        ) 
equal  91.55%  89.61%  88.59%  95.53% 
inverse NSR  96.86%  88.04%  89.79%  97.16% 
     
equal  0.0498  0.1016  0.0970  0.0340 
inverse NSR  0.0376  0.0834  0.0700  0.0239 
 
Using these variations we find that the results for our individual and composite indica-
tors do not change dramatically. Strong changes could only be observed for different 
weighting schemes. However, as they were mostly restricted to the unbalanced compo-
site indicators of the ECB and EC (which are more the bivariate signal of a single indi-
cator than a proper diversified composite indicator), this strengthens the analysis of the 
indicators and the validity of the approach. 
8  Summary and Conclusion 
The current problems of some countries of the European Monetary Union to service 
their debts, manifested in high spreads of interest yields on government bonds, lead to 
the widespread wish of a stronger surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. This sur-
veillance is supposed to go far beyond the criteria of government debt and deficit of the 
stability and growth pact.  
We analyzed four existing proposals for possible indicators of macroeconomic imbal-
ances in this paper. Using the framework of a signals approach we test weather these in-
dicators of macroeconomic imbalances could be used as an early-warning system for 
public debt crises. We found out that – consistent with economic theory – most indica-
tors were helpful in signaling the current public debt crises. For the indicators that did 
not give valid signals before the current crisis, the missing signals could be explained by 
either the new-economy-bubble, the exchange rate development of the Euro, or the con-
vergence of interest rates on public debt after the introduction of the euro. All other in-
dicators  showed  a  slow building-up  of  macroeconomic  imbalances  in  very  different  
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areas of the economies (covered by different indicators). The culminated imbalances 
lead to economic problems triggered by the financial crisis that we could observe main-
ly in the four crisis countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). The results for sin-
gle indicators were stable under different crisis definitions. This leads to the conclusion, 
that they reflect relevant economic imbalances and problems that lead to deteriorating 
public debts. 
Going further from the single indicators, we analyzed composite indicators for every 
proposed indicator set. Not surprisingly, the in-sample forecast quality (as measured in 
terms of utility) of the composite indicators is better than that of almost all single indi-
cators.34 A further improvement can be achieved by combining all indicators of all dif-
ferent sets into one single composite indicator. Doing this, we had to be careful to keep 
a certain balance between the five different categories. The composite indicator      , 
introduced in section 6, outperformed (or has been as good as) all other composite indi-
cators not only in terms of utility, but also in terms of different other quality measures. 
This recommended indicator also reflects the desire of ECB (2010) to ideally use only 
one indicator to have condensed information about the amount of macroeconomic im-
balances in Europe while still capturing as many different developing imbalances as 
possible.  
In addition to the optimal (in terms of utility) construction of composite indicators, we 
also showed the results obtained by using different weighting schemes. This robustness 
check is necessary since we observed debt crises in only four out of eleven countries 
since the introduction of the Euro. This means that there might be as well other sorts of 
imbalances leading to public debt crises in the future. The purely theoretical reason for 
other weighting schemes (in absence of any knowledge of future developments, one 
would choose equal weights for every indicator) is strongly supported by the results of 
the indicator      , calculated with equal weights and presented in section 6.  
Because of our ignorance of the exact location, where the next crisis will start to devel-
op and unfold, we propose to combine as many meaningful single indicators as possible 
in one composite indicator using equal weights. We also suggest undertaking in-depth 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of  country  cases if a risk is signaled. This will 
hopefully help to issue warnings and allows for time to address potential problems be-
fore they culminate in a fully grown crisis like the current ones. 
                                                 
34   This is not entirely true for the sets of the ECB and the EC, since they rely heavily on competitive-
ness indicators that could not send any valid signals before the public debt crises. Thus, these sets 
depend almost completely on the current account deficit (in case of the EC set) and government debt. 
Since the values of the indicators are translated in a bivariate signal, the ECB and EC composite in-
dicator is nearly bivariate itself.  
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